Moral Licensing: When Doing Something Good Makes Us Feel Entitled to Do Something Bad

Why do good deeds sometimes make people less ethical? From controversial hiring experiments to recent research on reputation, psychologists have spent more than two decades investigating the strange relationship between morality, self-image, and our next decision.
Imagine someone who considers themselves deeply committed to fairness. They support equal opportunities, reject discrimination, and have repeatedly demonstrated these values through their actions.
Then, during a hiring decision, they express a preference that seems to contradict everything they claim to believe.
How can the two coexist?
One possibility is that their previous good behaviour has made the later decision feel less morally threatening. Having already established themselves as a fair person, they may feel less concerned about what their next choice says about their character.
This is the central idea behind moral licensing: the possibility that behaving morally can, under certain circumstances, make people more willing to behave less morally afterward.
It is a particularly unsettling concept because it challenges something we tend to assume about human behaviour: that doing good makes us more likely to continue doing good.
But the psychological evidence tells a more complicated story.
What Is Moral Licensing?
Moral licensing, also called moral self-licensing, refers to a psychological effect in which an earlier moral action reduces a person's reluctance to engage in a later action that may be selfish, ethically questionable, or inconsistent with their values.
The theory suggests that people care not only about behaving morally but also about seeing themselves—and being seen by others—as moral individuals.
When that identity feels secure, some of the psychological pressure to maintain it may diminish.
Consider a few hypothetical examples:
Someone who regularly volunteers begins to feel that they have already contributed enough and becomes less willing to help when another opportunity arises.
A manager who recently championed workplace equality feels less concerned that a subsequent hiring preference could appear discriminatory.
A consumer who purchases an environmentally friendly product becomes more comfortable making a less sustainable choice afterward.
These are illustrations, not proof that moral licensing caused any particular decision. The psychological effect can only be established by comparing behaviour under controlled conditions.
Importantly, moral licensing does not necessarily mean that someone consciously thinks they have earned the right to behave badly. The proposed process may occur without deliberate moral calculation.
Nor does it suggest that every good deed will produce a bad one.
The central research question is more precise: Can an earlier moral action change the probability of a later ethical decision?
Who Discovered Moral Licensing?
The modern experimental study of moral licensing is generally traced to psychologists Benoît Monin and Dale T. Miller, whose influential 2001 paper, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, appeared in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
Their work helped establish what became known as the moral credentials approach.
Although ideas about moral compensation and balancing good and bad behaviour existed before their research, Monin and Miller were among the first to systematically demonstrate the phenomenon experimentally.
Their research focused on an uncomfortable possibility: that establishing oneself as nonprejudiced could make someone more willing to express a potentially prejudiced preference later.
The theory was subsequently developed by several other researchers.
In 2006, Uzma Khan and Ravi Dhar investigated licensing in consumer decisions. In 2009, Sonya Sachdeva, Rumen Iliev, and Douglas Medin explored moral self-regulation through charitable giving and cooperation.
Then, in 2010, Anna Merritt, Daniel Effron, and Benoît Monin published a major theoretical review, Moral Self-Licensing: When Being Good Frees Us to Be Bad. This review helped clarify the different psychological explanations underlying the phenomenon.
Together, these researchers transformed moral licensing from an intriguing experimental finding into a broader theory of how people regulate their moral identities.
The Experiment That Started It All: Can Rejecting Sexism Make Someone More Willing to Discriminate?
In 2001, Monin and Miller conducted three experiments examining whether establishing a nonprejudiced identity could influence later decisions.
Their first experiment investigated gender discrimination.
Participants were initially presented with statements expressing blatantly sexist attitudes. Some participants had the opportunity to reject these statements, thereby demonstrating their opposition to sexism.
Afterward, participants evaluated whether a man or a woman would be more suitable for a stereotypically masculine job.
The researchers found that participants who had been given the opportunity to reject the sexist statements were subsequently more willing to favour a male candidate.
The suggested explanation was not that rejecting sexism had somehow made participants more sexist.
Instead, rejecting the statements may have reassured participants about their own moral character, making a subsequent gender-based preference feel less threatening to their self-image.
The second experiment followed a related procedure.
Participants first had an opportunity to select a woman or an African American candidate for a job that was not stereotypically associated with a particular demographic group.
Later, they were asked about a position associated with majority-group stereotypes.
Participants who had previously established nonprejudiced credentials were more willing to express preferences favouring members of the majority group.
The third experiment introduced an especially interesting distinction: Did other people need to know about someone's moral credentials for licensing to occur?
The researchers found evidence that participants were more willing to express a potentially controversial preference even when the audience was unaware of their earlier nonprejudiced response.
This suggested that moral licensing might involve more than simply managing appearances. A person's private understanding of their own moral identity might also influence later decisions.
These findings were influential, but they came from particular experimental settings. Moreover, later replication research would challenge their reliability.
Source: Monin & Miller (2001).
Two Ways Moral Licensing Might Work: Moral Credits and Moral Credentials
One of the most important theoretical developments came from distinguishing between two proposed mechanisms: moral credits and moral credentials.
Although the concepts sound similar, they describe different processes.
Moral credits: Treating morality like a bank account
The moral credits model proposes that people sometimes behave as though their good deeds accumulate psychological credit.
A person who has recently helped someone may feel that they have already contributed sufficiently, making them less inclined to help again.
In this metaphor, a good deed is a deposit, and a later questionable act is a withdrawal.
The person does not necessarily reinterpret the questionable behaviour as good. Instead, the earlier deed may make the overall balance feel acceptable.
This model is closely related to the idea of moral self-regulation.
Moral credentials: Changing what a questionable action means
The moral credentials model works differently.
Here, the earlier good deed establishes something about the individual's identity.
A person who believes they have demonstrated fairness may interpret a later potentially discriminatory decision as harmless or justified by circumstances rather than as evidence of prejudice.
The earlier action does not simply compensate for the later one. It influences how that later action is understood.
Merritt, Effron, and Monin (2010) argued that distinguishing between these mechanisms was essential for understanding moral licensing.
Their review also raised a question researchers continue to investigate: Are people granting themselves permission, or are they responding to how they expect others to judge them?
The Charity Experiment: When Thinking of Yourself as Good Changes How Much You Give
In 2009, Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin published Sinning Saints and Saintly Sinners: The Paradox of Moral Self-Regulation in Psychological Science.
Their research investigated whether temporarily changing a person's moral self-concept could influence later prosocial behaviour.
In the first experiment, participants were asked to write a self-relevant story using words associated with positive or negative moral characteristics.
Some participants wrote about themselves using morally positive traits, while others used negative traits.
Afterward, they were presented with an opportunity to donate money to charity.
The results were striking.
Participants in the positive-trait condition donated approximately one-fifth as much as those in the negative-trait condition.
In other words, participants who had just written about themselves in morally positive terms donated substantially less than participants who had been prompted to consider morally negative characteristics.
The researchers proposed that affirming one's moral identity could reduce motivation for an additional good deed. Conversely, confronting a less favourable moral self-image might encourage compensatory generosity.
Two subsequent experiments explored the role of self-concept and extended the findings to cooperation in environmental decision-making.
These experiments became some of the most widely discussed evidence for moral balancing.
But their results would later face an important challenge.
Source: Sachdeva et al. (2009).
Can Buying Something Ethical Make People Behave Less Ethically?
Moral licensing research soon expanded beyond prejudice and charitable giving.
In 2010, Nina Mazar and Chen-Bo Zhong published Do Green Products Make Us Better People?
Their experiments examined the relationship between environmentally friendly consumption and later ethical behaviour.
The researchers distinguished between two experiences: being exposed to green products and actually purchasing them.
This distinction produced very different results.
Participants who were merely exposed to environmentally friendly products subsequently behaved more altruistically than participants exposed to conventional products.
However, participants who purchased green products subsequently showed less altruism and were more likely to cheat or take money dishonestly in experimental tasks than those who purchased conventional products.
The researchers interpreted these findings as evidence that an ethical purchase could temporarily strengthen a person's moral self-image and reduce their reluctance to engage in questionable behaviour.
The distinction between exposure and purchasing is particularly fascinating.
Simply encountering products associated with morality seemed to encourage prosocial behaviour, while personally making the moral choice appeared to produce the opposite effect.
At least, that was what the original experiments suggested.
As we will see, later studies were unable to reproduce these findings reliably.
Source: Mazar & Zhong (2010).
What About Everyday Life?
Laboratory experiments can isolate psychological mechanisms, but they also create artificial situations.
Do similar effects appear in ordinary life?
In 2014, Wilhelm Hofmann, Daniel Wisneski, Mark Brandt, and Linda Skitka published Morality in Everyday Life in Science.
Rather than examining only isolated decisions in a laboratory, the researchers collected repeated reports of moral and immoral experiences from 1,252 participants.
This approach, called ecological momentary assessment, allows researchers to investigate experiences closer to when they occur.
Participants reported morally relevant events throughout their everyday lives, including actions they committed, witnessed, or experienced as recipients.
The researchers found evidence of both moral contagion and moral licensing in daily behavioural patterns.
This was an important development because it suggested that moral regulation might not be limited to artificial experimental tasks.
Nevertheless, identifying patterns across everyday experiences is not the same as experimentally establishing their causes.
For instance, when someone reports a moral act followed by a questionable one, other circumstances may have influenced both events.
The study demonstrated that moral behaviour varies dynamically across daily life. It did not establish that every apparent sequence of good followed by bad is caused by licensing.
Source: Hofmann et al. (2014).
Then Came the Replication Problem
By the middle of the 2010s, moral licensing had become a familiar concept in social psychology.
But researchers increasingly began asking whether the original results could be reproduced.
This matters because a compelling psychological explanation is not necessarily a reliable scientific finding.
In 2014, Irene Blanken, Niels van de Ven, Marcel Zeelenberg, and Marijn Meijers attempted to replicate the moral licensing effects reported by Sachdeva and colleagues.
They conducted three studies involving 105, 150, and 940 participants, respectively.
None reproduced the original licensing effect.
Five years later, Jan Urban, Štěpán Bahník, and Markéta Braun Kohlová published three attempts to replicate the green-consumption findings of Mazar and Zhong.
Across 1,274 participants, they manipulated green consumption and measured subsequent dishonesty using tasks that offered opportunities to cheat for money.
Again, they found no evidence that green consumption increased dishonest behaviour.
A further challenge appeared in 2024.
Qinyu Xiao and colleagues conducted a preregistered replication of Monin and Miller's original moral credentials research, using 932 participants after exclusions.
The researchers found essentially no licensing effect in the ethnicity-related hiring scenario.
In the gender-related scenario, the results went in the opposite direction from the original prediction.
Together, these findings raised serious questions about how consistently moral licensing occurs.
They did not prove that moral licensing never happens. Instead, they demonstrated that some influential experimental procedures were far less dependable than initially assumed.
Sources: Blanken et al. (2014); Urban et al. (2019); Xiao et al. (2024).
What Do Large Meta-Analyses Actually Say?
A meta-analysis combines results from multiple studies to estimate the strength and consistency of a finding.
Because individual psychology experiments often involve relatively small samples, these reviews are particularly important.
2015: Evidence for a small effect
Blanken, van de Ven, and Zeelenberg examined 91 studies involving 7,397 participants.
Their meta-analysis estimated a moral licensing effect of Cohen's d = 0.31, generally interpreted as a small effect.
However, they also found that published studies tended to report larger effects than unpublished studies.
This raised the possibility of publication bias: studies producing statistically significant findings may be more likely to appear in academic journals than studies finding no effect.
2019: The estimated effect becomes smaller
Niclas Kuper and Antonia Bott revisited the evidence using statistical techniques designed to account for publication bias.
Depending on the correction method, they obtained effect-size estimates ranging from d = −0.05 to d = 0.18.
The methods did not produce identical answers, but both suggested that earlier estimates may have exaggerated the effect.
The authors recommended larger studies and preregistration to strengthen future research.
2024: Moral licensing is only one possible outcome
A particularly comprehensive investigation appeared in Psychological Bulletin.
Rose Ferguson and colleagues conducted two meta-analyses examining what happens when an initial moral or immoral behaviour is followed by another decision.
Their first analysis included 217 effect sizes and 31,242 participants. The second included 132 effect sizes and 14,443 participants.
They found evidence for moral licensing under particular conditions, with an estimated g = 0.25 in studies measuring subsequent negative behaviours.
But they also identified situations in which initial moral actions encouraged further prosocial behaviour.
This distinction is fundamental.
Previous moral behaviour can sometimes lead to moral balancing, in which people shift toward the opposite kind of behaviour.
Under other conditions, it can encourage moral consistency, in which people continue behaving in accordance with their previous actions.
Rather than always asking whether good deeds make people behave worse, researchers increasingly ask what determines the direction of their next decision.
Sources: Blanken et al. (2015); Kuper & Bott (2019); Ferguson et al. (2024).
The Major 2026 Finding: Moral Licensing May Be More About Reputation Than We Thought
One of the most important recent contributions comes from Amanda Rotella, Jisoo Jung, Christopher Chinn, and Pat Barclay.
Their article, published online in 2025 and appearing in the September 2026 issue of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, investigated a question that had remained unresolved for decades:
Does moral licensing occur because people feel morally secure, or because they believe others already see them as good people?
The researchers conducted a preregistered meta-analysis covering 115 experiments and 21,770 participants.
They examined whether the strength of moral licensing depended on participants being observed.
The results were revealing.
In conventional meta-analytic models, the licensing effect was substantially larger when participants were explicitly observed (g = 0.65) than when they were unobserved (g = 0.13).
After accounting for publication bias through a robust Bayesian analysis, the estimated effect among explicitly observed participants remained g = 0.51.
Among unobserved participants, the corresponding estimate was effectively zero (g = −0.01).
This suggests that moral licensing may be especially likely when individuals have established their moral standing in a social setting.
For example, someone whose good behaviour has already been witnessed may anticipate less reputational damage from a subsequent questionable decision.
Their previous behaviour could provide a kind of social protection.
Importantly, the findings do not establish that private self-image plays no role. The researchers described evidence for purely internal mechanisms as inconclusive.
There were also limitations: the explicitly observed subgroup contained relatively few effects, and the meta-analysis compared methodological characteristics across studies rather than randomly assigning observation conditions in one unified experiment.
Nevertheless, this research offers a plausible explanation for why earlier laboratory experiments sometimes identified licensing while later online replications did not.
It may not be enough for individuals to feel good about themselves.
Under some conditions, what matters is that someone else has already seen them behaving well.
Source: Rotella et al. (2026).
More Recent Research: Can Moral Identity Prevent Licensing?
If moral licensing depends partly on how individuals understand their moral identity, could that identity also protect against the effect?
In 2025, Liting Fan, Yuhao Zhou, Shuwei Lin, and Binghai Sun published Stay Hungry for Morality: The Inhibitory Effect of High Moral Identity and Moral Elevation on Moral Licensing.
Across three studies, the researchers examined the influence of recalling previous moral behaviour.
They found that people differed in how they responded to these recollections.
Participants with relatively high moral identity—those for whom being a moral person was especially important—were more likely to demonstrate moral consistency.
Participants with lower moral identity were more likely to demonstrate licensing.
The researchers also examined moral elevation, a positive emotional response to witnessing acts of exceptional goodness.
Their findings suggested that moral elevation could reduce licensing among participants with lower moral identity.
This introduces an interesting possibility.
Remembering that we have done something good may have different consequences depending on what goodness means to us.
For someone who treats morality primarily as an achievement, an earlier good deed might feel like something already accomplished.
For someone who regards morality as an enduring personal commitment, that same deed might encourage continued ethical behaviour.
These results come from a limited set of studies, however, and should not be interpreted as a universally effective intervention.
Source: Fan et al. (2025).
What Did Researchers Find in 2026 About Environmental Behaviour?
Recent studies suggest that the type of moral action may also matter.
In a 2026 preregistered quasi-experimental study involving 514 participants, Laura Pasca and Sofía Moreno-Gata examined different forms of environmentally responsible behaviour.
They distinguished between relatively routine conservation practices, such as recycling, and behaviours involving changes in consumption patterns, such as adopting a vegetarian or vegan diet.
The researchers found that making routine conservation behaviours salient could reduce guilt and perceived environmental impact associated with subsequent unsustainable actions.
By contrast, the efficiency-oriented behaviours they examined were associated with less licensing and greater continuation of environmentally responsible actions.
These findings suggest that not every environmentally friendly behaviour has the same psychological consequences.
Another 2026 publication, a scoping review by Alexander Yuriev, examined 49 publications about moral licensing and pro-environmental behaviour.
It reported that more than 80% of the reviewed publications supported the licensing effect.
That sounds impressive, but the figure needs interpretation: a scoping review counts and describes published findings. It does not necessarily correct for publication bias or establish that every reported effect survives independent replication.
Taken together, the research suggests that environmental licensing warrants continued investigation, particularly in relation to how actions are framed, how consequential they feel, and whether people regard them as isolated accomplishments or part of an ongoing commitment.
Sources: Pasca & Moreno-Gata (2026); Yuriev (2026).
So, Does Doing Good Really Make Us Behave Badly?
The current scientific picture is more nuanced than the original theory might suggest.
Moral licensing has been documented across experimental, observational, and meta-analytic research.
But its estimated size varies considerably depending on the studies included, the behavioural outcomes measured, the statistical methods employed, and the circumstances in which participants make decisions.
Several classic experiments have failed to replicate.
At the same time, newer research offers evidence that moral licensing is more detectable in certain social contexts, particularly when people are observed and their reputation is relevant.
There is also meaningful evidence for the opposite outcome: good behaviour encouraging further good behaviour.
This means that an earlier moral action cannot be treated as a reliable predictor of someone's next decision.
The crucial question may not be whether a person has behaved morally before.
It may be what that previous behaviour comes to mean to them.
Does it reassure them that they have already done enough?
Does it establish a reputation they feel protected by?
Or does it reinforce a standard they want to continue meeting?
The same experience could plausibly influence future behaviour in different directions.
The Larger Question: Are We Trying to Be Good, or to Feel Good About Ourselves?
Moral licensing raises a distinction between moral behaviour and moral identity.
We generally want to believe that our decisions reflect stable principles. Yet our understanding of ourselves is continually influenced by what we have recently done, what others know about us, and how we interpret our own actions.
A good deed can represent a commitment to certain values.
But it can also become evidence we use to reassure ourselves that we are already good people.
Those interpretations are not necessarily equivalent.
One may encourage continued responsibility. The other may, under particular circumstances, make additional effort feel less necessary.
The research does not justify assuming that charitable people are secretly selfish, that ethical consumers are hypocrites, or that expressions of fairness are insincere.
Nor does it mean that people should distrust every good deed.
Instead, moral licensing provides a useful way to examine a more subtle possibility: that our desire to maintain a positive moral identity can sometimes influence decisions in ways that contradict our intentions.
Perhaps the most interesting lesson is that morality is not simply a collection of isolated actions.
It is also an ongoing process of interpreting who we are, what we have done, and what we believe is expected of us next.
Doing something good does not guarantee that our next decision will be good. But neither does it condemn us to behave badly. What matters is whether a previous good deed becomes a reason to stop—or a reason to continue.
References
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Fan, L., Zhou, Y., Lin, S., & Sun, B. (2025). Stay hungry for morality: The inhibitory effect of high moral identity and moral elevation on moral licensing. The Journal of Social Psychology, 165(6), 896–910. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2024.2439953
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Xiao, Q., Li, L. C., Au, Y. L., Tan, S. N., Chung, W. T., & Feldman, G. (2024). Licensing via credentials: Replication Registered Report of Monin and Miller (2001) with extensions investigating the domain-specificity of moral credentials and the association between the credential effect and trait reputational concern. International Review of Social Psychology, 37(1), Article 10. https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.945
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